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This article employs Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) to investigate 
whether, and under what conditions, trust is viable in markets. The emergence and 
breakdown of trust is modeled in a context of multiple buyers and suppliers. Agents 
develop trust in a partner as a function of observed loyalty. They select partners on the 
basis of their trust in the partner and potential profit, with adaptive weights. On the 
basis of realized profits, they adapt the weight they attach to trust relative to 
profitability, and their own trustworthiness, modeled as a threshold of defection. Trust 
and loyalty turn out to be viable under fairly general conditions.  
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1.1 Research question 
 
The viability of trust between firms in markets is a much-debated issue (for a survey, see 
Nooteboom, 2002). Economics, in particular transaction cost economics (TCE), doubts the 
viability of trust, on the argument that under competition, in markets, firms are under pressure 
to opportunistically utilize any opportunity for profit (Williamson, 1993). TCE proposes that 
people organize to reduce transaction costs, depending on conditions of uncertainty and 
specific investments, which yield switching costs and a resulting risk of hold-up.  
In this article we employ TCE logic, but we also deviate from TCE in two fundamental 
respects. First, while TCE assumes that optimal forms of organization will arise, yielding 
maximum efficiency, we consider that problematic. The making and breaking of relations 
between multiple agents with adaptive knowledge and preferences may yield complexities 
and path-dependencies, with unpredictable patterns of making and breaking relations, that 
preclude the achievement of maximum efficiency. The methodology of Agent Based 
Computational Economics (ACE) is well suited to model complexities of multiple 
interactions, and to see to what extent theoretical benchmarks of maximum efficiency can in 
reality be achieved.  
Second, while TCE assumes that reliable knowledge about loyalty or trustworthiness is 
impossible (Williamson, 1975), so that opportunism must be assumed, we expect that loyalty 
may be inferred from observed behaviour (Six, 2005). In contrast with Williamson (1993) we 
                                                 
1 The authors wish to acknowledge the work on earlier versions of the model used in this 
article by Tomas B. Klos and Martin Helmhout. 
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propose that in markets loyalty may be viable, in yielding profit. While loyalty may carry 
opportunity costs it may also yield benefits of stable relationships that yield economies in 
learning by ongoing interaction. To investigate this, the methodology of ACE enables us to 
take a process approach to trust (Gulati, 1995; Zucker, 1986; Zand, 1972), by modeling the 
adaptation of trust and trustworthiness in the light of experience in interaction.  
The analysis is conducted in the context of transaction relations between multiple 
buyers and suppliers, where buyers have the option to make rather than buy, which is 
the classical setting for the analysis of transaction costs.  
In our model we include incremental improvement, in exploitation, as a result of 
ongoing collaboration, but we do not include radical innovation or exploration (March 
1991, Nooteboom 2000). The reason for this is that we expect to contradict the 
proposition from TCE that trust is not viable in markets, and to make a strong case we 
bias the model in favour of TCE. TCE is most likely to be valid under static conditions. 
As Williamson (1999) acknowledged, TCE does not cover conditions of radical 
innovation. Under innovation, uncertainty is greater, hence contracts are more 
problematic, and the need for trust increases. Also, in static conditions competitive 
pressure of price competition is greater than in innovation, and the greater competitive 
pressure is, the less room there is for loyalty and trust. Hence, if we take a static context 
rather than one of innovation, the claim of TCE that trust is not viable gets the best 
shot.  
We proceed as follows. First we discuss previous agent based models of trust, and 
we indicate how our model compares to them. Second we describe our model and 
indicate how it fits in the categorization of complex adaptive systems and agents  
proposed by Holland (1996). Third, we specify the experiments. Fourth, results are 
presented and discussed, first for some illustrative time paths of individual relationships 
and next for averages across agents (buyers, suppliers). We draw conclusions 
concerning the viability of trust in markets. Finally, we indicate shortcomings of our 
model and avenues for further research.  
 
1.2. Other ACE models of trust 
 
Many earlier attempts have been made at agent-based modeling of trust and related 
issues, to analyze emergent properties of complex interaction that would be hard or 
impossible to tackle analytically. The purpose of these models varies widely. Some 
study the effectiveness of sanctions and/or reputation mechanisms and agencies to 
support them, e.g. in information systems or supply chains (Zacharia et al., 1999; 
Meijer and Verwaart, 2005; Diekmann and Przepiorka, 2005), or in artificial societies 
(Younger, 2005). Some study self-organization, e.g. in the internalization of 
externalities in a common pool resource (Pahl-Wostl and Ebenhöh, 2004), the 
emergence of leadership in open-source communities (Muller, 2003), or the emergence 
of cooperative social action (Brichoux and Johnson, 2002). Others investigate the 
working of decision heuristics (Pahl-Wostl and Ebenhöh, 2004; Marsella et al., 2004).    
The general set-up is that of multiple agents who can profit from each other but are 
uncertain about the quality or competence that is offered, sometimes allowing for 
multiple dimensions of quality, and dependencies between them (Maximilien and 
Singh, 2005). Other studies focus on the benevolence or intentions of agents, i.e. 
absence of cheating, in free-ridership, defection or expropriation of knowledge or other 
resources, and many look at both competence and intentions (Castelfranchi and 
Falcone, 1999; Pahl-Wostl and Ebenhöh, 2004; Breban, 2002; Muller, 2003; Gans et 
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al., 2001). This is line with the distinction made in the trust literature between 
competence trust and intentional trust (see e.g. Nooteboom, 2002).  
Mostly, agents are oriented only towards their self-interest, such as maximum profit, 
but some studies also allow for fairness and equity as objectives or dimensions of value 
(Pahl-Wostl and Ebenhöh, 2004). Mostly, trust is measured as a number between zero 
and one, and, following Gambetta (1988), is often interpreted as a subjective 
probability that goals will be achieved or no harm will be done. Mostly, conduct is 
individual, but sometimes allowance is made for coalitions (Breban, 2002). 
Few studies of defection explicitly model both sides of the coin: the expectation of 
defection by others (trust) and one’s own inclination to defect (trustworthiness). Also, 
most studies treat trust as of purely extrinsic value, in the achievement of profit, and do 
not include the possible intrinsic value of trust. Notable exceptions are Pahl-Wostl and 
Ebenhöh (2004) and Marsella et al. (2004). 
Trust is generally updated on the basis of experience, sometimes only one’s own 
experience in interaction, sometimes (also) on the basis of reputation mechanisms, 
sometimes with the services of some ´tracing agency´ (Zacharia et al., 1999; Meijer and 
Verwaart, 2005; Diekman and Przepiorka, 2005). Few studies are based on an explicit 
inference of competence or intentions, and even fewer studies explicitly model the 
decision heuristics used. Exceptions here also are Pahl-Wostl and Ebenhöh (2004) and, 
with great psychological sophistication, Marsella et al. (2004). A key question is 
whether agents have ‘a theory of mind’ on the basis of which they attribute 
competencies and intentions to others.  
While most studies model trust as adaptive, in the sense that it develops as a 
function of private or public experience, there is very little study, as far as I know, of 
adaptiveness of the importance attached to trust relative to profit, and of the 
adaptiveness of one’s own trustworthiness or inclination to defect.                  
Our model, to be described in the next section, shares different features with 
different models. It focuses on intentional trust (not competence trust), in terms of 
loyalty or defection, based on private experience (no reputation effects). Trust is 
adapted on the basis of observed defection, but only with simple reinforcement, without 
theory of mind and explicit decision heuristics. Next to trust it includes own 
trustworthiness, i.e. inclination to defect. Trustworthiness and the importance attached 
to trust are both adaptive, as a function of experience.  
The central purpose of our model is theoretical: to investigate whether the claim of 
transaction cost economics that trust cannot survive under competition (Williamson, 
1993) is correct. Under what conditions, if at all, are trust and trustworthiness viable in 
markets where the performance criterion is purely profit? The analysis is conducted in 
the context of transaction relations between multiple buyers and suppliers, which is the 
classical setting for the analysis of transaction costs.  
 
1.3. Sketch of our model 
 
We employ a model that is developed, with revisions and refinements, from an earlier 
model of Klos and Nooteboom (2001), and we conduct a series of new experiments. In 
this model, agents make and break transaction relations, i.e. are loyal or not, on the 
basis of preferences, with both trust and potential profit as dimensions of utility, with 
differential weights attached to them. Profit is a function of product differentiation, 
economy of scale from specialization, and learning by cooperation in ongoing relations. 
Economy of scale yields an incentive for buyers to go for a supplier who supplies to 
multiple buyers, which yields a bias towards opportunism, in breaking relations with 
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smaller suppliers. However, as argued in TCE, there is a loss involved in such 
switching, for activities that are based on relation-specific investments. In the present 
model, such investments are needed for specialty products, which carry higher profit 
margins. The percentage of specialty products and corresponding specific investments 
is a parameter of the model that can be set. The specialty part, which is relation-
specific, yields higher profit, and is also subject to learning by cooperation, as a 
function of an ongoing relationship. The latter advantage is lost when the relationship 
breaks, and thus yields switching costs, which yields an incentive for loyalty, in longer 
relationships that yield the advantage of learning by collaborating. In sum, the model 
incorporates the usual features of TCE: opportunism by defection, specific investments, 
economy of scale for non-specific investments, and switching costs. However, the 
model adds learning by cooperation, and it includes the possibility of trust as a 
dimension of utility, next to potential profit. Here, trustful relationships may also have 
intrinsic value, next to instrumental value in the form of assurance against opportunism, 
as has been widely recognized in the trust literature. 
Agents are adaptive in three ways. First, in the preference function, the relative 
weights of potential profit and trust are adaptive, as a function of realized profit. In this 
way, agents can learn to attach more or less weight to trust, relative to potential profit. 
Second, agents adapt their trust in a partner as a function of his past experience 
(Brousseau 2000) concerning his loyalty, exhibited by his continuation of relation, i.e. 
absence of defection. As a partner refrains from defection, this is interpreted as 
trustworthiness, and trust increases incrementally, but with decreasing returns. Trust 
drops discontinuously when the expectation of loyalty is broken and defection occurs. 
This reflects the idea, often referred to in the trust literature, that ‘trust comes on foot 
and leaves on horseback’. Third, agents also adapt their own trustworthiness, modeled 
as a threshold of exit from a relation, on the basis of realized profit. Thus, agents can 
learn to become more or less loyal.  
An essential feature of the model is that the adaptation of both the weight attached to 
trust and the threshold of defection occurs on the basis of realized profit. This biases the 
model in favour of Williamson’s (1993) claim that in order to survive in markets firms 
must make the highest possible profit, and cannot afford to accept less profit for the 
sake of trust. In the model, trust and trustworthiness can only emerge when they are 
favourable for realized profit.  
The model allows us to explore under what conditions, in terms of parameter 
settings, trust and loyalty increase, or are stable, i.e. when they are conducive to profit, 
and hence viable in markets. If it turns out that trust is viable in that sense, we have a 
strong claim, and trust can play an even bigger role when realized profit is not the only 
driver of adaptation.  
Starting values of agent-related parameters, such as trust, threshold of defection, and 
weight attached to trust, can be set for each agent separately. These reflect institutional 
conditions, such as prevailing ethics of conduct, performance of the legal system for reliable 
contracting, and intermediaries that are conducive to trust (Shapiro, 1987; Fukuyama, 1995; 
Putnam, 2000; Nooteboom, 2002). Other, non agent-related parameters, such as the 
percentage of product differentiation and specific assets, strength of economy of scale, 
strength of learning by cooperation, speed with which trust increases with duration of a 
relation, number of buyers, number of suppliers, and number of time steps in a run, are fixed 
per run, equally for all agents.  
Holland (1996: 38) proposed a categorization of complex systems in terms of properties of 
aggregation, non-linearity, flows, and diversity, and mechanisms of ‘tagging’, by which 
systems or components identify themselves, as a basis for connections between them, internal 
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models of the system’s environment, and building blocks. In particular, he characterized 
adaptive agents in terms of (1) a performance system of detectors that receive messages from 
the environment, and effectors in response to them, (2) credit assessment by which rules get 
rewarded or reinforced for adaptation, and (3) rule discovery. In our model, concerning 
properties there is aggregation of production of multiple suppliers for a single buyer, non-
linearity in economies of scale and learning by collaboration, and in feedbacks from 
experience to decision rules, flows of intermediate products and money between suppliers and 
buyers, and diversity of agent characteristics. Concerning processes, there are tags identifying 
suppliers and buyers. Tags of buyers indicate the extent of product differentiation, whether 
they are looking for potential suppliers, and their past loyalty. Tags of suppliers indicate the 
number of their current customers, and their past loyalty. Agents have internal models of the 
level and the value of the loyalty of their partners, their own loyalty (threshold of defection), 
and profitability as a function of product differentiation, economy of scale, and learning by 
collaboration. Building blocks are agents, preference formation, and matching between buyers 
and suppliers on the basis of preferences. In the performance system of actors, there are 
detectors of bids or requests for bidding, loyalty of partners, profitability, as a function of 
product differentiation, economy of scale and learning by interaction, and realized profit. 
There are effectors in inviting, making and accepting bids on the basis of preferences, which 
entail intentions to switch partners if the bid is made to others than the current partner, and in 
production and supply. There is credit assignment in adapting the weight attached to partner 
loyalty relative to profitability, and thresholds of own defection, as a function of realized 
profit. While in the model there is adaptation in decision rules, on the basis of credit 
assignment and reinforcement, as indicated, there is no discovery of new rules.  
The model is specified in more detail in the next section.            
 
 
2. Details of the model 
 
2.1 Preference and matching 
 
We focus on the risk that a partner will defect and thereby cause switching costs. In our model 
trust may be interpreted as a subjective probability that expectations will be fulfilled 
(Gambetta, 1988), which here entails realization of potential profit. Thus, expected profit (E) 
would be: E = profitability·trust. However, in the model, agents are allowed to attach more or 







trustityprofitabilscore      (1)  
 
where: scoreij is the score i assigns to j, profitabilityij is the profit i can potentially make 
‘through’ j, trustij is i's trust in j and αi ∈ [0, 1] is the weight i attaches to profitability relative 
to trust, i.e. the ‘profit-elasticity’ of the score. α is adaptive, as a function of realized profit. 
This functional specification, a ‘Cobb-Douglas’ function adopted from the literature on 
production functions, entails that profitability and trust are complements (they both contribute 
to the preference score) as well as substitutes (less profitability can be compensated with more 
trust).     
At each time step, all buyers and suppliers establish a strict preference ranking over all 
their alternatives. Random draws are used to settle the ranking of alternatives with equal 
scores. The matching of partners is modeled as follows. On the basis of preferences buyers 
are assigned to suppliers or to themselves, respectively. When a buyer is assigned to himself 
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this means that he makes rather than buys. In addition to a preference ranking, each agent has 
a ‘minimum tolerance level’ that determines which partners are acceptable. Each agent also 
has a quota for a maximum number of matches it can be involved in at any one time. A 
buyer’s minimum acceptance level of suppliers is the score that the buyer would attach to 
himself. Since it is reasonable that he completely trusts himself, trust is set at its maximum of 
1, and the role of trust in the score is ignored: α = 1. The algorithm used for matching is a 
modification of Tesfatsion's (1997) deferred choice and refusal (DCR) algorithm and it 
proceeds in a finite number of steps, as follows: 
  
1. Each buyer sends a maximum of oi requests to its most preferred, acceptable suppliers. 
Because the buyers typically have different preference rankings, the various suppliers will 
receive different numbers of requests. 
2. Each supplier ‘provisionally accepts’ a maximum of aj requests from its most preferred 
buyers and rejects the rest (if any). 
3. Each buyer that was rejected in any step fills its quota oi in the next step by sending 
requests to next most preferred, acceptable suppliers that it has not yet sent a request to.   
4. Each supplier again provisionally accepts the requests from up to a maximum of aj most 
preferred buyers from among newly received and previously provisionally accepted 
requests and rejects the rest.  As long as one or more buyers have been rejected, the 
algorithm goes back to step 3. 
 
The algorithm stops if no buyer sends a request that is rejected. All provisionally accepted 
requests are then definitely accepted. 
It may, and often does, happen that suppliers have no buyer to supply to. The question then 
is whether in the absence of profit they should fail to survive. In the model, to maintain the 
number of buyers and suppliers, for reasons of experimentation, they do not disappear, and 
are available in the next round. Implicitly, the assumption therefore is that either they have 
alternative means of subsistence, or they do drop out, but are replaced at the same rate by new 
entrants that inherit their characteristics.  
 
2.2 Trust and trustworthiness 
 
Trust, taken as inferred absence of opportunism, is modelled as observed loyalty, i.e. observed 
absence of defection.  Following Gulati (1995), we assume that trust increases with the 
duration of a relation. As a relation lasts longer, i.e. there is no defection, one starts to take the 
partner's behaviour for granted, and to assume the same behaviour (i.e. commitment, rather 
than breaking the relation) for the future. Thus, agent i's trust in another agent j depends on 





















1)1( ,ini,ini ,     (2) 
where  j
it = agent i's trust in agent j, 
j
itt ,ini = agent i's initial trust in agent j, 
x = the past duration of the current relation between agents i and j, and 
f = trustFactor. 
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This function is taken simply because it yields a curve that increases with decreasing 
returns, as a function of duration x, with 100% trust as the limit, and the speed of increase 
determined by the parameter f .   
In addition, there is a base level of trust, which reflects an institutional feature of a society. 
It may be associated with the expected proportion of non-opportunistic people, or as some 
standard of elementary loyalty that is assumed to prevail. If an agent j, involved in a relation 
with an agent i, breaks their relation, then this is interpreted as opportunistic behaviour and i’s 
trust in j decreases; in effect, i's trust drops by a percentage of the distance between the 
current level and the base level of trust; it stays there as i's new initial trust in j, j itt ,ini until the 
next time i and j are matched, after which it starts to increase again for as long as the relation 
lasts without interruption.  
The other side of the coin is, of course, one’s own trustworthiness. This is modelled as a 
threshold τ for defection. One defects only if the advantage over one’s current partner exceeds 
that threshold. It reflects that trustworthiness has its limits, and that trust should recognize this 
and not become blind (Pettit, 1995; Nooteboom, 2002). The threshold is adaptive, as a 
function of realized profit.  
 
2.3 Costs and profits 
 
An important assumption is that profit generated in any buyer-supplier relation is equally 
shared. In other words, the model does not include hold-up as a function of possible 
asymmetric dependence. Thus, we allow for defection but not for the threat of defection with 
the purpose of increasing one’s share in jointly produced added value. 
Profit has the following elements. First, buyers may increase returns by selling more 
differentiated products. Second, suppliers may reduce costs by generating production 
efficiencies. There are two sources of production efficiency: economy of scale from a supplier 
producing for multiple buyers, and learning by cooperation in ongoing buyer-supplier 
relations. Economy of scale can be reaped only in production of standardized products, with 
general-purpose assets, and learning by cooperation can only de achieved in production that is 
specific for a given buyer, with buyer-specific assets. 
This yields a link with the fundamental concept, in TCE, of ‘transaction specific 
investments’. We assume a connection between the differentiation of a buyer’s product and 
the specificity of the assets required to produce it. In fact, we assume that the percentage of 
specific products is equal to the percentage of specific assets. This is expressed in a variable di 
∈ [0, 1]. It determines both the profit the buyer will make when selling his products and the 
degree to which assets are specific, which determines opportunities for economy of scale and 
learning by cooperation. This parameter is part of the ‘state of the world’, in this case the 
market, and applies to all agents, in a given run of the model. 
Economy of scale is achieved when a supplier produces for multiple buyers. To the extent 
that assets are specific, for differentiated products, they cannot be used for production for 
other buyers. To the extent that products are general purpose, i.e. production is not 
differentiated, assets can be switched to produce for other buyers. In sum, economy of scale, 
in production for multiple buyers, can only be achieved for the non-differentiated, non-
specific part of production, and economy by learning by cooperation can only be achieved for 
the other, specific part.  














1,0max      (3) 
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where: 
for the scale effect, f= sf = scaleFactor, x is general-purpose assets of supplier j summed over 
all his buyers.  Here, y denotes scale efficiency achieved by supplier j.    
for the learning effect, f = lf = learnFactor; x is the number of consecutive matches between 
supplier j and buyer i. Here, y denotes efficiency achieved in the collaboration between 
supplier i and buyer j.  
 
Formula (3) expresses decreasing returns for both scale and experience effects. The scale 
effect is specified in such a way that a supplier can be more scale-efficient than a buyer 
producing for himself only if the scale at which he produces is larger than the maximum scale 
at which a buyer might produce for himself. For the learning effect, a supplier’s 
buyer-specific efficiency is 0 in their first transaction, and only starts to increase if the number 
of transactions is larger than 1. If a relation breaks, the supplier’s efficiency due to his 
experience with the buyer drops to zero. The resulting specification of profit is specified in 




An agent is adaptive if ‘the actions of the agent in its environment can be assigned a value 
(performance, utility, payoff, fitness, or the like); and the agent behaves in such a way as to 
improve this value over time’ (Holland and Miller,1991, p. 365). This entails ‘credit 
assignment’ (Holland, 1996): certain decision rules are reinforced or weakened according to 
the (dis)credit they are given for success (failure). Here, success is measured by realised 
profit, which is attributed to preference formation (see formula 1). More specifically, agents 
adapt the values for α ∈ [0, 1] (weight attached to profit relative to trust) and τ [0, 0.5] 
(threshold of defection) from one time step to the next, which may lead to changes in the 
scores they assign to different agents. There is some randomness in the adaptation of α and τ, 
thus allowing for error and experimentation, according to the following procedure.  
At each time step, each agent assigns a ‘strength’ to each possible value of α and τ. This 
expresses the agent’s confidence in the success of using that particular value. The various 
strengths always add up to constants Cα and Cτ, respectively. At the start of each timestep, the 
selection of values for α and τ is stochastic, with selection probabilities equal to relative 
strengths, i.e. strengths divided by Cα and Cτ, respectively. The strengths of the values that 
were chosen for α and τ at the start of a particular timestep are updated at the end of that 
timestep, on the basis of the agent's performance during that timestep, in terms of realized 
profit: the agent adds the profit obtained during the timestep to the strengths of the values that 
were used for α or τ. After this, all strengths are renormalized to sum to Cα and Cτ again 
(Arthur, 1993). The idea is that the strength of values that have led to high performance 
(profit) increases, yielding a higher probability that those values will be selected again. This is 
a simple model of ‘reinforcement learning’ (Arthur, 1991; Arthur, 1993; Kirman and Vriend, 
2000; Lane, 1993).  
 
2.4 The algorithm 
 
The algorithm of the simulation is presented by the flowchart in Figure 1. This figure shows 
how the main loop is executed in a sequence of discrete time steps, called a ‘run’. Each 
simulation may be repeated several times as multiple runs, to even out the influence of 
random draws in the adaptation process. At the beginning of a simulation, starting values are 
set for certain model parameters. The user is prompted to supply the number of buyers and 
suppliers, as well as the number of runs, and the number of timesteps in each run. At the start 
 9 
of each run, all agents are initialized, e.g. with starting values for trust, and selection 
probabilities for α and τ. In each timestep, before the matching, each agent chooses values for 
α and τ, calculates scores and sets preferences. Then the matching algorithm is applied. In the 
matching, agents may start a relation, continue a relation and break a relation. A relation is 
broken if, during the matching, a buyer does not send any more requests to the supplier, or he 
does, but the supplier rejects them. 
 
--------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------- 
 
After the matching, suppliers that are matched to buyers produce and deliver for their 
buyers, while suppliers that are not matched do nothing. Buyers that are not matched to 
suppliers produce for themselves (‘self-matched’, in ‘make’ rather than ‘buy’). Afterward, all 
buyers sell their products on the final-goods market. Profit is shared equally with their 
supplier, if they have one. Finally, all agents use that profit to update their preference rankings 
(via α and τ), used as input for the matching algorithm in the next timestep. Across timesteps 
realized profits are accumulated for all buyers and suppliers, and all the relevant parameters 
are tracked.  
Note that it is conceivable, given the logic of matching, that a supplier breaks with a buyer 
in his aim to go for a more attractive one, then lose the bidding for that buyer, and be left 
empty-handed. Then, it would be more reasonable for the supplier to first verify his goal 
attainment before breaking his existing relationship. However, in a large set of simulations, 
across a wide area of parameter space, this happened only once, at a very high level of 
opportunism, and it may not be unrealistic that sometimes such error is made, in an over-






According to TCE efficient outcomes are attained. Here, we expect: 
 
Proposition 1: In interaction between multiple agents efficient outcomes are seldom obtained 
  
According to TCE, high asset specificity leads to more make rather than buy. We expect 
the same result in our extended framework, according to the same argumentation, as was also 
found also in the initial experiments by Klos and Nooteboom  (2001). When trust is low, 
specific assets yield hazards due to switching costs, and with few generalized assets there is 
little economy of scale to be achieved in outsourcing to producers who supply to multiple 
buyers. However, going beyond the initial experiments in Klos and Nooteboom (2001), we 
investigate the possibility of high trust allowing for make even at high levels of specificity.  
 
Proposition 2:  When trust is low, higher asset specificity/differentiated products yields less 
outsourcing.  
 
We further expect: 
 
Proposition 3: The more trust, the more collaboration in ‘buy’, rather than ‘make’. 
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Proposition 4: The lower the weight attached to profit relative to trust (α ), the more 
collaboration (buy rather than make), and the more loyalty (less switching). 
 
Proposition 5: The higher the threshold of defection (τ ), the more collaboration (buy rather 
than make), and the more loyalty (less switching). 
 
Counter to TCE we expect: 
 
Proposition 6: Even in markets, where profit guides adaptation, high trust (low α; high τ ) 
may be sustainable. 
 
In particular, we expect: 
 
Proposition7:  Trust is viable when there is a strong effect of learning by cooperation relative 
to economy of scale, which yields relatively high switching costs, and favours loyalty, in 
ongoing relations. 
 
Recall that if during the matching between buyers and suppliers a buyer decides to ‘buy’ 
rather than ‘make’, he can follow two different strategies. One is an opportunistic scale 
strategy, where the buyer seeks a profit increase on the basis of economy of scale, by trying to 
find a supplier who serves more than one buyer. This entails much switching and less 
emphasis on loyalty and trust. The other strategy is the learning by cooperation strategy, 
seeking an increase of profit in ongoing relations. This entails less switching and more 
emphasis on loyalty and trust. Thus, in manipulating the strength of the scale effect relative to 
the effect of learning by cooperation, we can bias the model towards opportunism or loyalty. 
This interacts with the degree of asset specificity/specialization, since economy of scale 
applies only to general-purpose assets, and learning by cooperation only to specific assets. 
Note that there is an overall bias towards the opportunistic scale strategy, in that economy of 
scale is immediate, thus yielding a more immediate return in profits, while learning by 
cooperation takes time to build up. Thus, we are again stacking the odds in favour of the TCE 
theory that we criticize. However, this does seem to be a realistic feature, supporting the 
intuition that trust is more viable in a long-term perspective.  
 
3.2 Model parameters 
 
Given the number of variables and the range of potential values for each, the total parameter 
space, with all possible combinations of values, is huge, and some limitation must be imposed 
to limit the number of simulations. 
One limitation was imposed for technical reasons: Each buyer's offer quota (maximum 
number of suppliers used) was fixed at 1. A larger number would require the distribution of 
the total volume of the buyer’s production across the multiple suppliers. In the present setting, 
having more suppliers makes little sense, since it reduces the corresponding volumes of 
production, lowering economy of scale, without any compensating advantage. The usual 
reason for a buyer to engage in ‘multiple supply’ is to improve bargaining position in the 
division of added value. However, in the present model there is no room for conflict over that. 
Division of jointly produced added value is assumed to be equal. In this model, opportunism 
lies entirely in defection to another partner, not in the expropriation of proceeds.        
The present model incorporates some refinements and revisions of an earlier model 
published by Klos and Nooteboom (2001), but the main difference concerns the experiments 
conducted with it. In their article, Klos and Nooteboom focused on the basic logic and 
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composition of the model, on the calibration of parameters across the full range of possible 
values, and the model was used: 
   
‘.. only for a first round of experiments, aimed at illustrating how this type of model might 
work and at testing elementary hypotheses to assess the plausibility of outcomes. As 
expected, and predicted by TCE, product differentiation favours ‘make’ relative to ‘buy’. This 
is because the transaction cost of switching is larger and there is less potential for economy of 
scale in large volumes of production for multiple buyers by specialized suppliers. As also 
expected, when there is more ‘make’, due to high product differentiation, the weight attached 
to trust .. declines faster. The experiments also illustrate that profits are not always optimal, 
even after adaptation settles down in a stable outcome …. This reflects the path dependence 
that arises in the making and breaking of relations: paths to optimal results can get blocked.’ 
(Klos and Nooteboom, 2001, pp. 523-524). 
 
In other words, previously the model was not yet used to explore under what conditions 
trust would be viable, if adaptation is driven by realized profit, which is the central question in 
the present paper. Here, we conduct the following experiments.  First, we investigate whether 
even at high levels of specificity/product differentiation there may be less outsourcing, if 
initial trust is high. Second, we explore the central question when high initial trust and 
trustworthiness are sustainable, and do not unravel, and when, if ever, low initial trust and 
trustworthiness increase.  
 In the present experiments, we do not aim to develop a representative map of the 
occurrence of loyalty or defection across the entire space of possible parameter values. That 
might be the purpose of another set of simulations. Here, we make use of some of the results 
of previous experiments to zoom in on parts of the space of parameter values that are relevant 
or salient for our present purpose. The main guiding principle for this was that we are 
especially interested in how certain key variables affect the prevalence of loyalty or defection. 
Those key variables are: the extent of product differentiation, trade-off between economies of 
scale and economies of learning, and ‘types of societies’ in terms of starting values of 
parameters related to loyalty (weight attached to partner loyalty in the calculation of 
preference, and threshold of own loyalty). We excluded values for other parameters that ruled 
out, from the start, either loyalty or defection, for all values of the variables of interest. This 
yielded the following choices.  
 While the threshold of defection τ , determining the extent of loyalty, can conceivably rise 
up to 1, a maximum of 0.5 was set because earlier  simulations showed that otherwise 
relations would get locked into initial situations, with little switching. Note that this lowering 
of the possible extent of loyalty biases the model in favour of opportunism, and hence against 
our claim that trust may be viable in markets, and thus favours TCE.  
Each supplier's acceptance quota (maximum number of customers) was set to 3. In 
previous experiments with each supplier j's acceptance quota set to the total number of 
buyers, the system quickly settled in a state where all buyers buy from a single supplier. Then, 
economies of scale swamp advantages from economies of learning by collaboration. To give a 
chance to advantages from collaboration, the potential gains from economy of scale had to be 
constrained. This limits the validity of results to industries where a maximum of three 
customers is usual. This appears to apply to a range of industries, such as: cars, consumer 
electronics, computers, ships, telephones, large buildings and large infrastructural projects, 
etc. 




Table 1 about here 
------------------------ 
 
Each simulation run involves 12 buyers and 12 suppliers. Admittedly, this is fairly 
arbitrary, and may be varied in later simulations. With a maximum of 3 buyers for each 
supplier, this yields the possibility of 4 suppliers each supplying the maximum of 3 buyers, as 
the situation of maximum usage of economy of scale. Each run continues for 100 timesteps. 
This is chosen to yield convergence on reasonably stable outcomes. In order to reduce the 
influence of random draws, each run is repeated 25 times and results are averaged across all 
runs.  
For the test of our propositions, we consider different values for the percentage of specific 
assets/differentiated products: d = 25, 45, and 65 %. We vary initial trust in the range 10, 50 
and 90%, initial threshold for defection (τ) from 0 to 0.5, initial weight attached to profit 
relative to trust (α) from 0.0 to 1.0, and the fixed parameters of both the strength of economy 
of scale and learning by cooperation from 0.5 to 0.9.  
First to give some feel of what is going on, we present and discuss time paths for selected 
individual relations, to illustrate the process of switching, or lack of it. These cases were 
selected not as representative, but as salient illustrations of what can happen in the simulation. 
Subsequently, we present the overall results, in comparison with our expectations, on the 




4.1  An individual trajectory for high trust and low α 
 
Averages across agents and runs hide a great variety of trajectories for individual firms and 
relationships. Therefore, we first present some of those trajectories, to give a feel for what is 
going on. Since we are particularly interested in what happens at high trust, we select high 
trust cases. First, we take a case from a simulation with parameters: Initial Trust is 90%, the 
weight attached to profit relative to trust (α ) is zero, the threshold of own defection (τ ) is at 
its maximum of  0.5, the factors indicating the strength of learning and economy of scale 
(Learnfactor & Scalefactor) had an intermediate value of 0.5. In this case, which is biased 




Figure 2 about here 
------------------------- 
 
Figure 2 shows the actual profit for buyer 2. Recall that higher levels of specialization (d) 
yield higher profit margins. For the run with d=0.25 buyer 2 buys from supplier 6, for d=0.45 
from supplier 3 and for d=0.65 from supplier 2. In his relation with supplier 6, for d = 0.25, 
his trust in that supplier increases up to almost the maximum of 1.0 (see Figure 3). Not shown 
is the result that the same applies to supplier’s trust in buyer 2. For other values of d buyer 2 
has no relation with supplier 6, so that his trust does not get any opportunity to rise. Supplier 
6’s profit is shown in Figure 4.  For d = 0.25, he offers a big scale effect, producing for 3 
buyers simultaneously: buyers 4 and 6 in addition to buyer 2. For d = 0.65, supplier 6 has 2 
buyers, nr. 5 and 6, and he doesn’t have any buyer for d=0.45. Not shown is the result that 
supplier 6’s weight attached to profit relative to trust (α ) and threshold of own defection (τ) 
remain about the same as their starting values. As shown in Figure 5, buyer 2 at first thinks he 
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can increase profit by increasing the weight attached to profit relative to trust (α), but then 
learns that this does not work and reduces it again. Not shown is that his threshold of own 
defection (τ ) remains at its initial value of  0.5.  
 
------------------------- 












4.2 An individual trajectory for high trust and high α   
 
Next, we take a case with the same parameter settings (e.g. high initial trust, maximum own 
loyalty), except that now the weight attached to profit relative to trust (α) switches from the 
lowest to the highest value: α =1.0.  
 
-------------------------- 
Figure 6 about here 
-------------------------- 
 
Figure 6 shows that buyer 5 makes rather than buys for average and high d during the full 
simulation period. For low d he makes until he finds supplier 1 who already produces for two 
other buyers, i.e. nr. 2 and 6, and then maintains a stable relation with supplier 1. It allows 
him to get a maximum attainable profit, from combining advantages of scale with those of 
learning by cooperation. As illustrated in Figure 7, he now learns to reduce the weight he 
attaches to profit (α), and to attach more weight to trust. Not included in the figures is the 
result that for both the buyer and supplier trust increases from 0.9 to approximately 1.0.  
 
------------------------ 
Figure 7 about here 
------------------------ 
 
Figure 8 shows how in this run supplier 1’s profit increases as he builds up relationships 
with multiple buyers.  
 
------------------------ 
Figure 8 about here 
------------------------ 
 
Figure 9 shows that early on in the run supplier 1 lowered the value of his defection 
threshold τ. This reflects the fact that suppliers would rather have a buyer with more highly 
differentiated products (higher d than the current low value of 0.25), with higher profit 
margins and more potential for economies of cooperation. However, subsequently supplier 1 
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learned to raise the threshold τ again, tending to return to its original high of 0.5. Evidently, 
the lower τ did not yield the increase of profit he hoped for.  
 
------------------------- 
Figure 9 about here 
------------------------- 
 
4.3 Overall results 
 
Now we turn to the more representative, overall results, in terms of averages across agents 
and runs. Earlier, we proposed that: 
 
1. In interactions between multiple, adaptive agents, maximum efficiency is seldom 
achieved 
2. In the absence of high levels of trust, outsourcing occurs only at low levels of asset 
specificity 
3. High trust levels yield higher levels of outsourcing at all levels of asset specificity 
4. Low weight attached to profit relative to trust yields more outsourcing and less 
switching 
5. High threshold of defection yields more outsourcing and less switching 
6. Under fairly general conditions, high trust levels are sustainable in markets 
7. The choice between an opportunistic switching strategy and loyalty depends on the 
relative strength of scale effects and learning by cooperation 
 
We present the results in the order of different starting values of trust, from high through 
intermediary to low trust, under the same conditions concerning the relative strength of scale 
effect and learning by cooperation, and under the same initial conditions concerning weight 
attached to trust and threshold of defection, all taken at intermediate levels of their possible 
range.  The different starting levels of trust reflect different institutional settings, from high to 
low trust ‘societies’. In particular, the question is whether high initial trust can be sustained, 
and whether perhaps distrust can evolve into trust. For a high level of initial trust we also 
investigate the effects of different starting values of weight attached to trust, threshold of 
defection, and relative strengths of economies of scale and learning by collaboration.  
In the analysis, we consider maximum profit actually obtained, towards the end of a run, 
because of adaptation processes. We look at maximum profit relative to maximum attainable 
profit. This was done to enable comparison of effects of collaboration between different 
conditions of markets and technology (differentiated products, scale and learning effects) that 
affect maximum attainable profit in absolute terms. In other words, we compare the 
percentage of potential profit actually achieved. Detailed results are given in Appendix B. 
Here we discuss the main conclusions.  
All propositions are borne out by the experiments, except Proposition 7, which turned out 
to be difficult to test unambiguously, due to interaction between different effects. We will 
return to this point later. Overall, relative profit declines more often than it increases, as we go 
from high to low trust. More precisely, under high trust maximum realized normalized profit 
is significantly higher than under low trust for intermediate and low levels of asset specificity 
(91 % and 80 %  of potential profit vs. 87% and 63%), and marginally lower for high asset 
specificity (98% vs. 99% of potential profit). Overall, this confirms the central Proposition 6 
that trust can well be viable in markets.  Outsourcing is highest under highest initial trust. This 
is in agreement with Proposition 3. For high product differentiation/specific investments, 
yielding limited potential economy of scale, buyers employ suppliers only at high initial trust, 
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and then have the maximum of 1 supplier per buyer. This is in agreement with Proposition 2. 
For details, see Tables B1, B3 and B4 in Appendix B.  
While we had the general expectation that maximum efficiency would seldom be achieved, 
due to the complexities of interaction between multiple agents (Proposition 1), we did not 
specify why, precisely. A recurring effect that was not foreseen but makes sense is the 
following. When product differentiation/specific investments (d) is high, there is a high 
potential for learning by collaboration, but little potential for economy of scale from involving 
multiple suppliers per buyer. Achieving maximum benefit from scale requires a building up of 
multiple suppliers per buyer, which takes time, and maximum possible profit may not, and in 
fact never is, achieved, due to the competition for suppliers among buyers, who block each 
others’ access to the maximum number. This effect is greater to the extent that the potential of 
employing multiple suppliers is greater, which arises when differentiation./specificity is 
lower. As a result, the percentage of maximum possible profit achieved is systematically 
lower for lower values of differentiation/specificity. This reflects the fact that in multiple 
interactions maximum efficiency is more or less difficult to achieve, which is neglected in 
TCE. This is in agreement with Proposition 1, and gives a specification of why, more 
precisely, maximum efficiency is not achieved. The difficulty of approaching optimal 
efficiency is also reflected in the fact that maximum actual profit is achieved only after many 
iterations.  
Given the purpose of this article, an important outcome is that the high levels of initial trust 
are sustained, and in fact increase, on average, from 90% to the maximum of 100%, which 
confirms Proposition 6. At high levels of trust, outsourcing takes place even at high levels of 
asset specificity. At a high level of differentiation/specificity, at a high level of initial trust 
buyers’ profit is about equal to profit under average or low initial trust. The advantage of 
realizing economy of scale by outsourcing, on the basis of higher trust, is limited at high level 
of specificity of investments. For details see Table B1 in Appendix B. 
At the high level of initial trust, we tested for differential effects of different strengths of 
scale effects relative to learning by collaboration (see Proposition 7). Stronger learning by 
cooperation increases profit more for high than for low levels of specific investments, as is to 
be expected. A stronger scale effect, however, also increases maximum attainable profit, 
which is not realized, so that the ratio between actual and potential profit declines. With these 
mixed and partly unforeseen results, it is difficult to test Proposition 7 unambiguously. We 
did find that a higher initial value for weight attached to profit relative to trust yielded less 
outsourcing, which is in agreement with Proposition 4. We also found that a higher initial 
value of the threshold of defection yielded more outsourcing and higher relative profit, in 
agreement with Proposition 5. For details, see Table B2 in Appendix B.  
Under medium or low trust, high product differentiation favours make relative to buy 
because the switching cost is larger and there is less potential for economy of scale. As a 
result, there is less outsourcing (Proposition 2). We find outsourcing only at the medium level 
of trust and at the lowest level of differentiation/specificity (see Table B3 in Appendix 2).  
One of the surprises from the analysis, though perfectly understandable in retrospect, is the 
following paradox. Profit from learning by cooperation is highest for the highest level of 
product differentiation (high d), but when trust is low buyers then prefer to make rather than 
buy, and thereby forego the opportunities for learning by cooperation. Also, when buyers 
focus on profitability rather than trust (high α), profit from economy of scale is instantaneous 
while learning by cooperation is slow, and the potential for economy of scale is low at high 
levels of differentiation. Thus, under low trust and low weight attached to it, buyers lock 
themselves out from the advantages of collaboration. When they outsource, it is mostly at low 
levels of differentiation, when learning by cooperation yields only modest returns, and then 
they learn to appreciate its accumulation. They wind up in outsourcing at high differentiation 
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only ‘by mistake’, then learn to appreciate it, and once learning by doing gets under way, a 
focus on profit keeps them in the relationship. In time, they may learn to attach more weight 
to loyalty and trust.  
Another surprising but understandable outcome is that, in partial contradiction with 
Proposition 4, it is not always the case that a high weight attached to profitability relative to 
trust favours opportunism. Once a buyer begins to profit from learning by cooperation, an 
emphasis on profit may also lead to loyalty, in an ongoing relationship, after learning that 
loyalty can pay.       
Overall, the results can be summarized as follows. A strong effect of learning by 
cooperation, a high weight attached to trust, and high loyalty favour the learning by 
cooperation strategy for high levels of specific investments, while a high weight attached to 
profit and high loyalty favour the scale strategy for low and average levels of specific 
investments.  
 
5. Discussion  
 
Of course, simulation is not equivalent to empirical testing. The test is virtual rather than real. 
Furthermore, we investigated only part of the total possible parameter space. We have only 
shown that under certain assumptions emergent properties of interaction satisfy expectations 
concerning the viability of trust in markets The significance of this depends on how 
reasonable the assumptions in the model and the restrictions on parameter values are 
considered to be.  
While overall results conform to expectations, surprises arose in the details of the 
dynamics of interaction. The overall outcome is that both trust and opportunism can be 
profitable, but they go for different strategies. This suggests that there may be different 
societies, going for different strategies, of switching or of loyalty, which settle down in their 
own self-sustaining systems. 
The experiments and the model have a number of shortcomings. In the experiments, we 
investigated only part of total parameter space, to zoom in on affects of variables that are of 
central theoretical interest. To arrive at more general conclusions, experiments would have to 
open up to unexplored areas of parameter space. That may be a topic for future research.  
One shortcoming of the model is that learning from experience is myopic. One learns 
about the loyalty of partners only from own experience, not from their conduct in 
relationships with others. In other words, there is no reputation mechanism. That design of the 
model was deliberate, to make a strong case against the thesis from TCE that trust is not 
viable in markets. With a reputation mechanism, opportunistic defection would pay even less. 
However, apart from the debate with TCE, exploration of the effects of a reputation 
mechanism might be worthwhile.  
Learning is also myopic in that adaptation by ‘credit assignment’ to parameters (weight 
attached to profit relative to trust, threshold of defection) is given only on the basis of one’s 
own realized profit. One might also learn from making inferences from profit observed from 
other agents. It was reasonable, in a first approach, to assume that one does not have 
information on both realized profit and relevant decision variables of other agents, to make 
inferences from correlations between them, but some learning from the success of others may 
need to be included.  
For example, we found that under conditions of low trust, low value attached to trust and 
low loyalty, buyers learn to appreciate the value of ongoing collaboration, and hence of 
loyalty and of trust, only when they wind up in outsourcing ‘by mistake’. On the one hand, 
this reflects a well-known principle of asymmetry from the trust literature: with an excess of 
trust one learns from betrayals of trust, while with a deficiency of trust, which keeps one from 
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engaging in collaboration, one robs oneself of the opportunity to learn that people may be 
trustworthy. On the other hand, it might be reasonable to assume that buyers include in their 
preference formation not only what they experienced but also the potential of collaboration 
that they did not experience but might either hear from others or observe from their conduct 
of collaboration and their success.  
Related to this, while the decision rules in the model include adaptation on the basis of 
experience, in three respects, i.e. update of observed loyalty, and adjustment of weight 
attached to profit relative to trust and of threshold of defection, and includes random 
experimentation concerning the latter two, the model does not include discovery of new 
decision rules.  
Finally, while the model includes some learning by doing, in collaboration, this learning is 
exploitative rather than explorative. The model does not cover buyer-supplier relationships for 
the purpose of innovation. This choice was also deliberate, to make a strong case against the 
thesis from TCE that trust is not viable in markets, since TCE is strongest under static 
conditions. But apart from the debate with TCE models of collaboration for innovation could 
be very worthwhile. However, the set-up of such a model would be very different. It goes 






Appendix  A Specification of profit 
 
The number of general-purpose assets that a supplier j needs in order to produce for a buyer i, 
is equal to )1)(1( , jsi ed −− , where es,j is an efficiency factor (0< es,j <1) of scale (s) in the 
production volume of supplier j. The number of buyer-specific assets that a supplier j needs, 
to produce for a buyer i, is equal to  )1( ,
i
jli ed − , where e
i
l,j is an efficiency factor (0< e
i
l,j<1) of 
learning by cooperation (l) in the relationship between buyer i and supplier j. Thus, the profit 
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The first part of the formula specifies returns and the second part specifies costs. It is 




Appendix B Details of results 
 
B.1 High initial trust 
 
First, we consider an initial situation of high, 90% trust across all agents. First, we take 
intermediate initial expected values for α (0.5) and τ (0.25). Next to the variation of degree of 
specificity (d = 0.25, 0.45, 0.65), we vary the strength of economy of scale (scale factor sf) 
and learning by cooperation (lf), as follows:  
- both scale and learning have intermediate strength (lf = sf = 0.5, see formula (3)) 
- high learning (lf = 0.9), medium scale (sf = 0.5). This is expected to favour a learning 
by cooperation strategy, with high loyalty 
- medium learning by cooperation (lf = 0.5), high scale (sf = 0.9). This is expected to 
favour a scale strategy, with less loyalty.   
The results are given in Table 1.  
 
------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------- 
 
Table 1 supplies maximum normalized profit actually achieved in the course of time, 
obtained by dividing the buyers’ maximum profits by the maximum attainable (theoretical) 
profit they can potentially make. This is the profit a buyer makes when he has an infinite 
relation with a supplier who produces for the maximum of 3 buyers. Usually maximum actual 
profit is achieved at the last steps of simulation because of adaptation processes in relations 
between buyers and suppliers. At the start point normalized profit turns out to be about 52 % 
for high d and 61 % for low d. Maximum scale effect is achieved when d is low. Here, the 
maximum arises in a situation where 12 buyers together buy from only 4 suppliers (each, i.e. 
one third of all suppliers each producing for the maximum of three buyers). Because the 
optimal network configuration, where suppliers produce for 3 buyers, rarely emerges, buyers 
organize closer to the optimum when d is higher. Then, buyers are less sensitive to the 
optimal configuration of network between agents, having less scope for increased efficiency 
by getting into an arrangement of one supplier producing for him as well as two other buyers.  
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For all levels of asset specificity (d), in each run at least one supplier produced for the 
maximum of 3 buyers, on average across runs 10 % of suppliers did this, 15% of suppliers 
produced for 2 buyers, 40 %  for 1 buyer, and 35% for 0 buyers. The results indicate that in 
this high-trust society buyers follow the strategy of learning by cooperation and loyalty for all 
d, without switching between suppliers, even for the low value d=0.25, where only 25% of 
assets are subject to learning by cooperation.  
Table 1 also shows the effect of different values for the strength of learning by cooperation 
(lf) and economy of scale (sf). Stronger learning by cooperation increases profit more for high 
than for low levels of specific investments, as is to be expected. A stronger scale effect, 
however, also increases maximum attainable profit, which is not realized, so that the ratio 
between actual and potential profit declines.  
So far, we assumed intermediate levels for the initial weight attached to profit (α) and for 
the threshold of defection (τ). Now we analyze the effects of varying those values: α = 0.0 
and 1.0; τ = 0.0 and 0.5. Learn and scale factors are fixed at the average level, i.e. 0.5. The 
results are given in Table 2. Here, we also supply the average number of suppliers per buyer, 
as an indicator of the extent of outsourcing. 
 
--------------------------  
Table 2 about here 
-------------------------- 
 
When α=0, agents put their emphasis on trust and follow the strategy of learning by 
cooperation for all d. The distribution of suppliers between buyers in this case is the same as 
before (Table 2). Each buyer has ongoing transactions with the same supplier but when 
loyalty is equal to zero (τ=0) buyers sometimes break relations with suppliers for high d 
because then profit doesn’t exceed the level of when they make. These buyers try to switch to 
other suppliers but they don’t succeed because all agents are concentrated on trust built up in 
the past of their current relation. Opportunistic buyers then return to their initial partners and 
as a result they lose in profit slightly, for high d, because of switching costs. If loyalty is high 
(τ=0.5) there is no switching for any level of d, and agents try to generate as much profit as 
possible in stable relations by using the advantage of loyalty and trust, in learning by 
cooperation. 
When α=1, agents focus on profitability rather than on trust, and buyers follow two 
strategies simultaneously: some of them buy from suppliers and others make themselves. 
When τ=0.0 approximately half of buyers have suppliers for d=0.25 and these buyers 
follow the scale strategy, seeking a supplier who already serves two buyers, and trying to 
match with him. As a result, in this case 17% of all suppliers produce for three buyers. For 
d=0.45 and d=0.65 buyers prefer to make themselves, mostly because outsourcing is only 
preferred as relations with suppliers last longer and generate economies of learning, but this is 
unlikely to happen at zero loyalty. However, because of high initial trust buyers try to reach 
suppliers sometimes and then lose profit a little because of switching costs. If τ=0.5 the 
proportion of buyers who have suppliers increases for all d: 60 % of buyers have suppliers for 
d=0.25, 40%  for d=0.45 and 30 % for d=0.65. However, the distribution of suppliers over 
buyers is different for all d. When d=0.25 approximately 20% of suppliers produce for three 
buyers and therefore profit is higher than in the case with τ=0.0. When d=0.45 about 12% of 
suppliers produce for three buyers and 5% of suppliers produce for one buyer and when 
d=0.65 suppliers produce only for one buyer and it is about 30% of them. Therefore, for low 
and average d more buyers follow the scale strategy because high loyalty allows them to keep 
stable relations with matched suppliers and generate higher profit than in the case with zero 
loyalty. For high d one part of buyers (70%) produce themselves and other part (30%) follow 
 20 
the strategy learning by cooperation because economies of learning are more important than 
scale effect. 
 
B.2 Average and low initial trust 
 
Now we turn to ‘societies’ with an average (50%) and lower level (10%) of initial trust. Learn 
and scale factors are again fixed at the average level, i.e. 0.5. The main outcome here is that 
buyers make for high and average levels of specific assets (d), and buy only for low levels. 
The results are specified in Tables 3 and 4.   
 
----------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
----------------------- 
 
At a medium level of initial trust, under low specific assets (d = 0.25) trust increases from 
an average to the highest level. This may seem surprising, since then the effect of learning by 
cooperation is lowest, so that the rewards of a trust strategy seem lowest. The explanation is 
as follows. Under average trust, suppliers are more attractive than buyers consider themselves 
to be only for low d, because potential losses in case of switching are smaller for low d than 
for high d. For high levels of specificity, buyers never enter into relations with outside 
suppliers, and thus never profit from collaboration and forego opportunities for the build-up 
of trust. For low specificity, the risk of outsourcing is less, and outsourcing occurs even if 
trust is not high. Then, advantages of learning by doing, even though limited by low d, set in, 
and advantages of loyalty are experienced, yielding an increase of trust.   
Compared with the corresponding case in the high trust world (first column, Table 1), 
normalized profits are the same for high and low values of d, but lower for intermediate 
values. The network configuration of suppliers and buyers for low d is the same as in the case 
of high initial trust: 10% of suppliers produce for 3 buyers, 15% of suppliers produce for 2 
buyers, 40 % for 1 buyer, 35% for 0 buyers. Buyers follow the learning by cooperation 
strategy in ongoing relations without switching.  
In the case of low initial trust, see Table 4, buyers produce themselves (have no suppliers) 
even for a low level of specific assets. The result is a drop of normalized profits for low d, 
compared to the medium and high trust cases. All opportunities for learning by cooperation in 
collaboration are foregone.  
 
----------------------- 
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Table 1. Parameters and variables in the simulation. 
 
 Param./var. Value 
range 
Value used 
General Number of buyers, I 
Number of suppliers, J 
Number of runs, R 
Number of timesteps, T 
Number of values for α∈[0, 1]  
Number of values for τ∈[0, 0.5] 
Base Trust, b 




















Per buyer I Differentiation, di 
Offer quota, oi 
[0, 1] 
{1,2,…, J} 




Acceptance quota, aj 
Scale Factor, Y 










Table B1. Buyers’ maximum normalized profits for high initial trust, at different learn and 
scale factors 
Buyers max. normalized Profit  
D 
#S.per 
buyer lf =0.5;sf=0.5 lf=0.9;sf=0.5 lf=0.5;sf=0.9 lf=0.9;sf=0.9 
0.65 1 0.98 0.994 0.978 0.99 
0.45 1 0.91 0.92 0.89 0.90 
0.25 1 0.80 0.81 0.77 0.78 
 High initial trust is sustained, and in fact increases from 0.9 to the maximum of 1.0 
 
 
 Table B2. Buyers’ maximum normalized profits for different α and τ 
Buyers max. normalized profit & #suppliers per buyer  
D α=0.0; τ=0.0 α=0.0; τ=0.5 α=1.0; τ=0.0 α=1.0; τ=0.5 
0.65 0.96 1 0.99 1 0.96 0 0.99 0.3 
0.45 0.91 1 0.91 1 0.85 0 0.92 0.4 




Table B3. Buyers’ maximum normalized profits for average initial trust 
D #Suppl. per buyer Buyers max. normal. Profit 
0.65 0 0.97 trust remains at 0.5 
0.45 0 0.87 trust remains at 0.5 
0.25 1 0.80 trust increases to 1.0 
 
 
Table B4. Buyers’ maximum normalized profits for low initial trust 
D #Suppl. per buyer Buyers max. normal. Profit 
0.65 0 0.99   trust remains at 0.1 
0.45 0 0.87   trust remains at 0.1 
0.25 0 0.63   trust remains at 0.1 
 
 
